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ARTICLES
AN EVIDENTIARY PARADOX: DEFENDING THE
CHARACTER EVIDENCE PROHIBITION BY
UPHOLDING A NON-CHARACTER THEORY OF
LOGICAL RELEVANCE, THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES
Edward J. Imwinkelried *
"Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it's
enemy action."
- Ian Fleming, GOLDFINGER
1
The case became curiouser and curiouser.2 Paul Woods was
barely eight months old at the time of his death.3 The death of
any child is a tragedy; but, to say the least, the facts surrounding
Paul's death were suspicious. Paul died of a cyanotic episode.4
The Woods household was his second foster placement.5 During
his initial placement, he never suffered any breathing problems.6
Moreover, when he began experiencing such problems after his
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1967,
University of San Francisco; J.D., 1969, University of San Francisco. Professor Imwinkel-
tied is the former chairman of the Evidence Section of the American Association of Law
Schools and is the author of UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (rev. 1999).
1. IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER (Berkley Publ'g Group 1982) (1959), quoted in Stephen
E. Fienberg & D.H. Kaye, Legal and Statistical Aspects of Some Mysterious Clusters, 154
J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 61, 61 (1991).
2. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
3. See id. at 128.
4. Id. at 129.
5. See id.
6. Id.
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placement with the Woods family, he was treated at several dif-
ferent hospitals.' He had never had an episode during any of
those periods of hospitalizations.' When Paul died, the physicians
were unable to identify a cause of death.9 Yet, a forensic patholo-
gist, Dr. Vincent DiMaio, suspected foul play. ° He would eventu-
ally testify at Martha's trial that he thought that Paul's death
was homicidal." In his expert opinion, someone had smothered
Paul to death. 2 However, Dr. DiMaio was candid. On the witness
stand, he testified that although he believed there was a seventy-
five percent chance that someone had murdered Paul, there was a
remaining twenty-five percent chance that the cause of death was
some unknown disease.' 3 Dr. DiMaio even went to length of con-
ceding that the forensic evidence did not prove a murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. 14
Given Dr. DiMaio's concessions, his testimony standing alone
probably would not have produced a conviction. Indeed, the
prosecution's case might never have reached a jury; a trial judge
might have been forced to find the case legally insufficient and
grant a defense motion for a directed verdict. 5 However, the
prosecution had additional, potent evidence. During the preceding
twenty-five years, in one way or another, Martha had taken care
of many children, both her own and those of relatives and friends.
During that period, nine children had suffered at least twenty
cyanotic episodes while in Martha's custody.16 Seven of those chil-
dren had died.' v As in Paul's case, none of those children had ex-
perienced breathing difficulties while they were in a hospital
away from Martha; and, again as in Paul's case, the treating phy-
7. See id. at 130 n.5.
8. See id. at 129-30.
9. See id. at 130.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 130.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 324 (1979) (announcing that, in
deciding whether the prosecution has sustained its initial burden of production, the trial
judge must inquire whether a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); see also 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 9:88
(rev. ed. 2005) [hereinafter 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE] (discussing Woods);
Nickolas J. Kyser, Comment, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 535, 541-42 (1974).
16. Woods, 484 F.2d at 130.
17. Id.
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sicians had been unable to identify a definitive medical cause for
the fatal episodes.'" The presentation of the testimony about the
other twenty incidents sealed Martha's fate. The jury convicted,
and the appellate court affirmed.1 9
On the civil side, plaintiffs' attorneys in civil rights actions of-
ten encounter evidentiary challenges similar to the problem faced
by the prosecutor in United States v. Woods. For example, the
plaintiffs attorney representing a discharged employee may need
to establish that the employer was motivated by a discriminatory
animus.2" Unless the employer is stupid as well as biased, the
plaintiffs attorney may have no "smoking gun"-no documentary
evidence establishing the discriminatory motivation for the plain-
tiffs discharge.2 ' Just as the prosecution might well have suffered
a directed verdict in Woods without the benefit of the testimony
about the other twenty cyanotic episodes, the dearth of evidence
of discriminatory animus in a civil rights action may doom the
plaintiffs case.22 The parallel continues, though. The plaintiff
may be able to survive a nonsuit motion and gain a favorable ver-
dict if he or she can find evidence of other instances in which the
same employer took adverse personnel actions against similarly
situated employees, that is, employees of the same race, gender,
or age.23
In these cases, when the other incidents are sufficiently nu-
merous and similar to the alleged misconduct, any reasonably in-
telligent lay juror would find evidence of the other incidents con-
vincing. Indeed, it would be "an affront to common sense" to
exclude such evidence.24 The rub is that, at first blush, there is a
plausible objection to the introduction of such evidence. The ob-
jection is that the testimony amounts to inadmissible evidence of
the defendant's bad character. In the United States, it is a vener-
able, common-law principle that the proponent may not treat an
18. See id. at 130-32.
19. Id. at 129.
20. See Lisa Marshall, Note, The Character of Discrimination Law: The Incompatibil-
ity of Rule 404 and Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (2005).
21. See id. at 1069-70, 1086-87.
22. See id. at 1088.
23. See id. at 1065 (describing the evidence as "the employer's prior acts of animus").
24. R. v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421, 456 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the Use of the Doctrine of Chances as Theory of
Admissibility for Similar Fact Evidence, 22 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 73, 95-96 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Similar Fact Evidence].
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opposing litigant's other misconduct as circumstantial proof of the
misconduct alleged in the pleadings.25 Today, that principle is ex-
pressly codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The first sen-
tence of Rule 404(b) reads: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith."26 The proponent may not
argue that: (1) the other incidents demonstrate the person's bad
character; and (2) in turn, that character increases the probabil-
ity that the person committed the misdeed alleged in the plead-
ings2--in other words, the person acted "characteristically" or
"true to character" on that alleged occasion.28
Fortunately for both prosecutors and plaintiffs, however, most
courts have prevented an affront to common sense by recognizing
a theory for rationalizing the admission of this critical type of
evidence. Immediately after announcing the character evidence
prohibition, Rule 404(b) continues: Evidence of other misconduct
"may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident."29 As at common law, the
statute permits the proponent to introduce the evidence so long
as there is a tenable non-character theory of logical relevance.3 °
Indeed, every federal circuit has construed Rule 404(b) to mean
that the proponent may rely on any alternative theory-that is,
any theory other than the character theory forbidden in the first
sentence of the statute.3 1
In cases such as Woods and the hypothetical civil rights action
described above, the courts often invoke the doctrine of objective
chances as the non-character theory to legitimate the introduc-
tion of the evidence. In the criminal arena, the doctrine has be-
come a mainstay of child abuse and drug prosecutions. If, as in
Woods, the defendant claims that the child's death was an acci-
dent, the government may introduce evidence of other injuries in-
25. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
26. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
27. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:19 (rev. ed.
2005) [hereinafter 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE].
28. Riggins v. Alaska, 101 P.3d 1060, 1062 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Bingaman
v. Alaska, 76 P.3d 398, 408 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003)).
29. FED. R. EID. 404(b).
30. 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, §§ 2:20-:23.
31. See id. §§ 2:30-:31 (collecting cases from all the circuits).
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flicted on the child to prove the commission of an actus reus.32 Or
in a drug prosecution in which the defendant claims that he was
"merely present" at or an "innocent bystander" to a drug transac-
tion, the government may present evidence of the defendant's in-
volvement in other drug trafficking to show mens rea.33 Innocent
persons sometimes accidentally become enmeshed in suspicious
circumstances, but it is objectively unlikely that will happen over
and over again by random chance. By the same token, evidence of
a defendant's other discriminatory acts serves as the backbone of
the plaintiffs case in many civil rights actions.34
When the doctrine of chances initially made its advent in
American case law in the 1970s, its advocates were attorneys rep-
resenting the prosecution and plaintiffs. The character evidence
prohibition was firmly entrenched at common law and in evidence
statutes; and in order to satisfy the prohibition, those attorneys
seized on the doctrine of chances and urged the courts to accept it
as a non-character theory. In child abuse cases such as Woods,
prosecutors pressed the doctrine on the courts to persuade them
to receive evidence of other injuries to a deceased child or to other
children in the defendant's custody. Likewise, since bigoted de-
fendants rarely left a paper trail documenting their bias, civil
rights plaintiffs' counsel appealed to the doctrine to justify intro-
ducing evidence that was vital to proving the defendants' dis-
criminatory intent.3 At this early point in the evolution of the
doctrine, it was the defense bar, both criminal and civil, which at-
tacked the doctrine and contended that it did not qualify as a le-
gitimate non-character theory of relevance.
Paradoxically, in the past decade, the tables have turned. The
character evidence prohibition is no longer considered sacrosanct.
New psychological studies suggest that a person's highly particu-
larized character traits are more predictive of conduct than was
originally thought.36 At the federal level, over the objection of the
32. See John E.B. Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation,
1988 UTAH L. REV. 479, 535-38 (1998).
33. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 5:28, at 5-80 n.1 (col-
lecting cases in which defendant claims he was "merely present" or an "innocent by-
stander").
34. See Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on
Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 194-95 (1998); Mar-
shall, supra note 20, at 1065-66.
35. Marshall, supra note 20, at 1067-70, 1082-83.
36. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassess-
2006]
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United States Judicial Conference, Congress enacted Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-15 to selectively abolish the character evi-
dence prohibition in criminal and civil actions involving allega-
tions of sexual assault or child molestation.3 ' The legislation took
effect in July 1995."9 Two handfuls of state legislatures have fol-
lowed suit,4 ° and similar legislation is pending in other jurisdic-
tions.41 Now the prosecutors and plaintiffs' attorneys who once
championed the doctrine of chances as a non-character theory are
attacking the theory. Although the legislation enacted to date re-
peals the prohibition in only selected types of cases, there is a
sense that support for the prohibition has waned to the point that
it is time to think the formerly unthinkable and propose abolish-
ing the prohibition in its entirety. The argument runs that char-
acter evidence is indeed probative. 42 The abolitionists add that
even the premier doctrine of chances does not qualify as a genu-
inely non-character theory. 4 They contend that, on close scrutiny,
even that doctrine rests on implicit, forbidden assumptions about
the defendant's bad character.44 If the doctrine of chances is a
spurious non-character theory but excluding such vital evidence
offends common sense, then perhaps the character evidence pro-
ment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 515-17 (1991).
37. See JUD. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE
ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), re-
printed in 159 F.R.D. 51, 51-53 (1995).
38. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15.
39. Id.
40. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 2:23 (including
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah); Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes Are
Different: Why Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 413 and 414 That Permit Propensity Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Other Sex
Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 106 (2004) ("[Tlen states ... have adopted some version
of the rules.").
41. Lombardi, supra note 40, at 105.
Maryland Delegate Pauline Menes of Prince George's County and Maryland
Senator Jennie Forehand of Montgomery County sponsored a bill in January
2004 that would facilitate admissibility of other sex offenses as propensity
evidence in trials of child molesters. The proposed statute, which effectively
creates a "propensity evidence" exception in Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-
404(b), is modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 414 ....
Id.
42. See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 883-84 (1982).
43. See Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1259, 1262-65 (1995).
44. See Morris, supra note 34, at 200-01; Marshall, supra note 20, at 1070-73.
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hibition itself must go. Character evidence should be presump-
tively admissible, subject to the trial judge's discretion to exclude
otherwise admissible evidence as being unduly prejudicial.45 The
upshot is that if they are to uphold the character evidence prohi-
bition, then the former opponents of the doctrine of chances must
now come to its defense.
The thesis of this article is that the attacks on the doctrine of
chances are mistaken. The article develops that thesis in four
steps. The first part of this article describes both the character
prohibition and the general permissibility of non-character theo-
ries. The second part of the article focuses specifically on the doc-
trine of chances and explains why at least superficially the doc-
trine appears to qualify as a legitimate non-character theory. The
third part reviews the attacks that have been mounted on the
doctrine of chances. The fourth and final part evaluates those at-
tacks and demonstrates that they are erroneous. The attacks rest
on a misunderstanding of both the doctrine itself and the statisti-
cal inferences underpinning the doctrine. The article concludes
that evidence qualifying for admission under the doctrine pos-
sesses genuine non-character logical relevance. There may be a
case for abolishing or generally relaxing the character evidence
prohibition, but that case cannot be premised on the asserted in-
coherence of the doctrine of chances as a non-character theory.
I. THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE PROHIBITION AND THE GENERAL
PERMISSIBILITY OF NON-CHARACTER THEORIES OF LOGICAL
RELEVANCE
A. The Nature of the Distinction Between Character and Non-
Character Theories of Logical Relevance
In everyday life, we commonly rely on character reasoning. We
treat a person's past behavior as predictive of behavior on other
occasions.46 Suppose that the parent of two children comes home
to find childrens' DVDs strewn all over the floor of the family
room. The parent knows that one child tends to be messy and has
45. See Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific
Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 803-10 (1981); Marshall, supra note 20, at 1096-98.
46. See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 42, at 848.
20061
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repeatedly left DVDs on the family room floor. The parent also
knows that, in contrast, the other child tends to be neat and, to
her knowledge, has never left DVDs out of place. When the par-
ent confronts them, both children deny leaving the DVDs on the
floor; and the demeanor of the two children seems equally sincere.
It is to be expected that the parent will punish the child who has
frequently been messy in the past. It may be a bit simplistic to
reason, "he did it once, therefore he did it again;"47 but on a daily
basis, we all resort to such reasoning.
Why then generally bar such reasoning in the courtroom? To
appreciate the rationale for the general character evidence prohi-
bition, we must understand the nature of the forbidden theory,
notably the inferences it entails and the probative dangers posed
by those inferences. Figure 1 depicts the verboten theory:48
FIGURE 1
THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE PROHIBITION
THE ITEM OF EVIDENCE
The defendant's other misdeeds
THE INTERMEDIATE INFERENCE
The defendant's personal, subjective bad character
THE FINAL CONCLUSION
On the occasion alleged in the pleadings, the
defendant acted "in character," that is, consis-
tently with the character trait.
As Figure 1 indicates, the first step in a character theory is in-
ferring the defendant's personal, subjective bad character from
47. See State v. Newton, 743 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Wash. 1987) (referencing "the notion
that a person who has once committed a crime is more likely to do so again") (quotations
and citation omitted); Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial
Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 68-69, 80 (1984) (presenting the simplistic view that
"once a thief, always a thief'); Anne F. Curtin, Note, Limiting the Use of Prior Bad Acts
and Convictions to Impeach the Defendant-Witness, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (1981).
48. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 2:19, at 2-114 fig. 2-2.
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the defendant's prior misdeeds. Rule 404(b) refers to this step as
offering the uncharged acts for the immediate purpose "to prove
the character of a person."49 This step poses the probative danger
of prejudice, recognized in Rule 403.50 Here, "prejudice" denotes a
danger of misdecision.51 The Advisory Committee Note accompa-
nying Rule 403 explains that, in this context, "prejudice" means
that although an item of evidence is technically logically relevant,
realistically it will tempt the jury to decide the case on an im-
proper basis.52 The initial step in character reasoning forces the
jury to focus on the question of the type or kind of person the de-
fendant is. The jury must ask itself: Is the defendant a law-
abiding, moral person or a law-breaking, immoral individual? It
is hazardous to compel the jury to consciously advert to that
question. 3 There is a grave risk that the jury may decide to pun-
ish the defendant for being a criminal rather than because the ju-
rors are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the charged crime.54 If the defendant's uncharged mis-
conduct is heinous or repulsive, then, at a conscious level, a juror
might decide to nullify the rule that they may convict only if they
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The juror
might conclude that the defendant is simply so dangerous that
society must be protected by imprisoning the defendant. Alterna-
tively, the uncharged misconduct evidence could easily bias the
jurors at a subconscious level.
Assume that at the conclusion of their initial stage in reason-
ing, the jury concludes that the defendant has a subjective dispo-
sition or propensity toward illegal or immoral conduct. As Figure
1 illustrates, next the jurors must decide whether to treat that
propensity as proof that, on the alleged occasion, the defendant
acted consistently with his or her bad character trait. In the
words of Rule 404(b), the proponent urges the jury to conclude
49. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
50. See id. R. 403.
51. The philosopher Jeremy Bentham coined the expression, "misdecision." See JER-
EMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence; For the Use of Non-
Lawyers as Well as Lawyers, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 1, 105 (John Bowring
ed., Russell & Russell Inc. 1962).
52. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
53. See Mark E. Turcott, Similar Fact Evidence: The Boardman Legacy, 21 CRIM. L.Q.
43, 46, 48, 54, 56-57 (1979).
54. See I.H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 582-83 (1999) (illustrating moral preju-
dice); John T. Johnson, Comment, The Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Offenses in
Texas Criminal Cases, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 69, 78 (1973).
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that, at the time and place alleged in the pleadings, the defendant
engaged in "action in conformity" with the bad character trait.55
This inferential step poses a further probative danger. The dan-
ger is the risk that the jury will overestimate the probative worth
of the evidence.5"
Admittedly, within the past fifteen years, some psychological
researchers have reported that relatively confident predictions of
a person's behavior can be made when there is a large sample of
the person's conduct in very similar situations. However, there
is a good deal of research indicating that more generalized char-
acter traits are relatively poor predictors of conduct on a specific
occasion. 8 As one British commentator remarked:
Psychologists have reported for several decades on the tendency of
people to judge one another on the basis of one outstanding "good" or
"bad" characteristic. This is popularly known as the "halo effect." In
essence, it represents our propensity to oversimplify our perception
of others' personalities .... [There is a] tendency to exaggerate the
representativeness of particular conduct.... [The] monolithic view of
55. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
56. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 926 F.2d 1003, 1014 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel D. Blinka,
Evidence of Character, Habit, and "Similar Acts" in Wisconsin Civil Litigation, 73 MARQ.
L. REV. 283, 295 (1989); Randolph N. Jonakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for
Judicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 67, 68, 77 ("[Tlhe jury will be overly in-
fluenced by the negative character evidence .... ."); James W. McElhaney, Character and
Conduct, LITIG., Winter 1991, at 45-46 ("[Tlhe jury may give the defendant's past too
much weight. While a past obviously has probative value, the jury may plug the holes of a
weak case with the assumption that cats and firebugs do not change their stripes.").
57. See David Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove Con-
duct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279, 283 (1987); Davies, supra note 36, at 518; David J. Karp,
Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 15, 20, 24-25 (1994); Miguel A. M~ndez, The Law of Evidence and the Search
for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 230-34 (1996) (reporting on research by
Mischel and Shoda). Mischel and Shoda's
new work challenges the prevailing scientific and legal conclusions about the
value of predisposition evidence. If they are right about the relative stability
and invariance of the basic personality structure and about the stable pat-
terns of variability flowing from that structure, then consciously cheating cli-
ents might indeed tell us something about whether the defendant consciously
evaded his tax obligations.
M~ndez, supra, at 234.
58. See Miguel Angel M~ndez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003,
1052-55 (1984); Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L.
REV. 334, 351-54 (1979).
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traits of human personality does not enjoq the support of the psycho-
logical literature of the past half-century.
Situational, ad hoc factors can be far more influential than
character traits in shaping a person's conduct on a specific occa-
sion. Like the danger of misdecision, a risk of overvaluation of
evidence is a recognized probative danger that can countervail
against admissibility.6"
It is the concurrence of the probative dangers of misdecision
and overvaluation which accounts for the general rule excluding
character evidence. Although the evidence is logically relevant,
reliance on a character theory poses these two significant risks.
The combination of those risks is the rationale for the common-
law prohibition and the first sentence of Rule 404(b).
However, as previously stated, like the common law, the second
sentence of Rule 404(b) permits the proponent to rely on non-
character theories of logical relevance. To determine whether the
asserted theory qualifies, the trial judge must trace the entire
chain of inferences underlying the theory.61 The theory passes
muster if the inferential path between the item of evidence and a
fact of consequence in the case does not require any inferences as
to the defendant's personal, subjective character.62
In a given case, the question is whether the item of evidence is
relevant not only on a forbidden character theory but also on a le-
gitimate non-character theory. Rule 401 states such a liberal test
for logical relevance that any testimony about a defendant's prior
59. Roderick Munday, Stepping Beyond the Bounds of Credibility: The Application of
Section 1(t)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, 1986 CRIM. L. REV. 511, 513-14; see also
Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Plsychological studies . . .show
that moral conduct in one situation is not highly correlated with moral conduct in an-
other."); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Ca-
tharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 28 (1986-87) (stating that the "as-
sumption that global, highly generalized traits . . .determine just about everything" is
now largely discredited).
60. See Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1027-28
(1977).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
government must 'clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical infer-
ences' without adverting to a mere propensity to commit crime now based on the commis-
sion of crime then." (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1992))).
62. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowl-
edge, 81 NEB. L. REV. 115, 117, 123 (2002) ("[O]ther crimes, wrongs, or acts are only inad-
missible if the way the proponent is using the evidence requires an inference of character
at any point in the chain of inferences. . . ."); William Roth, Understanding Admissibility
of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 303 (1982).
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misconduct will be relevant on a character theory." The prior act
is some evidence of the defendant's propensity for misconduct;
and if allowed to, the proponent would argue that that propensity
at least slightly increases the probability that the defendant
committed the alleged misdeed. The issue is not an either-or
problem; rather, the issue is both-and. Does the item also possess
relevance on a legitimate non-character theory? If it does, the
typical solution is to admit the evidence but to give the jury a lim-
iting instruction under Rule 105. In the limiting instruction, the
trial judge: (1) negatively forbids the jury from treating the item
as character evidence; but (2) affirmatively specifies the accept-
able, non-character use of the item. 4
Over the centuries, the courts have developed myriad non-
character theories.65 Consider a simple example. Suppose that the
defendant is charged with burglarizing a bank on March 1, 2005.
Rather than forcing his way into the bank, the burglar used a key
to enter a side door. At the trial, the prosecutor offers evidence of
the defendant's uncharged misconduct. More specifically, the
prosecutor calls the bank president as a witness. The bank presi-
dent testifies along the following lines: On February 1, 2005, he
came home to find a burglar in his residence; he recognizes the
defendant as the burglar; one of the items missing after the resi-
dential burglary was the president's key to the side door of the
bank; and he has accounted for all the other keys to the side door.
The bank president's testimony is certainly logically relevant
on a character theory. The prosecutor could advance two different
character arguments. One would be that the February 1 burglary
shows the defendant's general criminal propensity and that that
propensity increases the probability that the defendant commit-
ted the charged crime. The prosecutor could also present the more
63. FED. R. EVID. 401. ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); see also United
States v. Casares-Cardenas, 14 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Relevance is established
by any showing, however slight, that makes it more or less likely . . . .") United States v.
Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The threshold for relevance is very low under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 401.").
64. See 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, §§ 9:72-:73.
65. See Uviller, supra note 42, at 877. Chapters 3-6 of Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence list and discuss the most popular theories employed in criminal cases. See 1 UN-
CHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27. Chapter 7 of Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence reviews the theories most commonly utilized in civil actions. See 2 UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15.
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compelling argument that the uncharged misconduct demon-
strates the defendant's propensity to commit burglary and that
propensity enhances the probability that the defendant perpe-
trated the charged burglary. Of course, both of those theories run
afoul of the character evidence prohibition codified in the first
sentence of Rule 404(b). If the prosecutor relied on either of those
theories, the judge would summarily sustain a defense objection
raising the prohibition.
However, on the facts of this case, the prosecutor can also ar-
ticulate a non-character theory. The February 1 offense put its
perpetrator in possession of the only missing key to the side door
of the bank burgled on March 1. The uncharged misconduct is
therefore logically relevant on a non-character theory to prove the
defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged March 1 of-
fense. The inferential path between the testimony about the Feb-
ruary 1 incident and the fact of consequence-the defendant's
identity as the perpetrator of the charged March 1 crime--does
not entail any inference as to the defendant's general tendency to
commit crimes or even a more specific tendency to perpetrate
burglaries. It is true that, in a given case, the trial judge can ex-
ercise his or her discretion under Rule 403 to bar otherwise ad-
missible 404(b) evidence if the evidence raised significant proba-
tive dangers.6 If the prosecution had ample other evidence of the
defendant's identity67 and there would be a time-consuming dis-
pute over the uncharged misconduct,6" the judge might invoke
Rule 403. However, in many cases, the judge admits the evidence
but administers a limiting instruction to the jury to maximize the
probability that the jury uses the evidence only for its legitimate,
non-character purpose.
66. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
67. The bank might be equipped with surveillance cameras that captured clear im-
ages of the defendant entering the bank by the side door.
68. The defense might sharply contest whether the defendant perpetrated the un-
charged act. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), as construed in Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 689-91 (1988), even if the judge rules the evidence admissible, the
defense may present contrary testimony to the jury. Assume that the bank president did
not view the defendant during the February 1 burglary. In that event, the prosecution
might have to rely on circumstantial forensic evidence to prove that the defendant com-
mitted the February 1 crime. The defense counsel might represent to the judge that if the
judge admits the evidence, the defense will be forced to call both experts disputing the
prosecution's forensic evidence and alibi witnesses establishing the defendant's where-
abouts on February 1. That testimony could easily consume several days of court time.
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B. The Importance of the Distinction Between Character and
Non-Character Theories of Logical Relevance
The distinction between character and non-character theories
is of great symbolic, constitutional, and practical significance.
The rule distinguishes our criminal justice system from both
Continental and totalitarian legal systems. It is a "'feature [, of
vast moment, that distinguishes the [American] from the Conti-
nental system of evidence."'69 In a traditional inquisitorial crimi-
nal trial on the Continent, "evidence of the character of the ac-
cused (including specific prior acts) is ... freely used."7 The trier
of fact essentially receives a dossier on the defendant's back-
ground. In totalitarian systems, the defendant can sometimes be
charged with the offense of being an enemy of the state or of hav-
ing an anti-social personality. The American legal system repudi-
ates that view. In the words of the Michigan Supreme Court, "[I1n
our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons. ''71
At trial, the defendant is held to answer only for the charged of-
fense, not his or her entire past.72
In criminal cases in the United States, this policy has constitu-
tional dimensions. In Robinson v. California,73 the Supreme Court
of the United States announced that the Eighth Amendment ban
on cruel and unusual punishment forbids a state from criminaliz-
ing a person's status.74 After a defendant has been found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offense, the trier of fact
may consider uncharged misconduct during sentencing. 75 How-
69. Morris, supra note 34, at 182 (quoting 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2, at 1213 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983)).
70. 1A WIGMORE, supra note 69, § 58.1, at 1212; see also id. § 58.1, at 1212 n.3 (refer-
encing a Danish rape trial, in which "the prior criminal record of the accused-a quite
lengthy record-was introduced in evidence before the determination of guilt," because
"[fin France the history of the accused, including his criminal record, is read out at the
beginning of the trial.'"); Lester B. Orfield, Relevancy in Federal Criminal Evidence, 43
NEB. L. REV. 485, 519 (1963).
71. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988).
72. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evi-
denced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 731 (1981); see also Louis H.
Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual
Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 9-12 (1996).
73. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
74. See id. at 666; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (recognizing the
impropriety of penalizing a person for his or her status).
75. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 1:06.
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ever, prior to the finding of guilt, the focus is on the question of
whether the defendant committed the specific act alleged in the
accusatory pleading.
Finally, the distinction between character and non-character
theories is of tremendous practical importance. On the criminal
side, Rule 404(b) is the most litigated provision in the Federal
Rules of Evidence.76 It generates more published opinions than
any other provision of the Rules.77 In many states, errors in ad-
mitting this species of evidence are the most common cause for
reversal on appeal.7" Further, the issue is of growing importance
in civil litigation. As we have already seen, the issue looms large
in civil rights actions in which the plaintiff must demonstrate
discriminatory intent.79 The distinction can not only determine a
plaintiffs ability to prove an intent necessary to establish liabil-
ity; the distinction has also become crucial when a plaintiff offers
evidence of a defendant's other misconduct as a predicate for im-
posing punitive damages.8 0 In all these cases, the key evidentiary
ruling by the judge may be the decision whether testimony about
a defendant's other misdeeds possesses genuine non-character
relevance. If the judge rules the evidence admissible, the prosecu-
tor or plaintiff often prevails.81 If the judge excludes the evidence,
the government or plaintiff may not even have enough evidence
to make out a submissible case and reach the jury. In Woods, if
the prosecution had had only Dr. DiMaio's testimony, it is doubt-
ful whether the government would have even taken the case to
trial.
76. See Morris, supra note 34, at 182 & n.6.
77. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 1:04, at 6 (citing 2
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE $ 404(08) (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 1996)).
78. Id. (citing Patrick Wallendorf, Note, Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Excep-
tion, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 153, 156)).
79. Morris, supra note 34, at 194-95. See generally Marshall, supra note 20.
80. See generally Jim Gash, Punitive Damages, Other Acts Evidence, and the Constitu-
tion, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1211-24 (discussing how the Federal Rules of Evidence deal
with the question of admissibility of prior misconduct).
81. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 1:02 (discussing the
empirical studies of the impact of uncharged misconduct evidence on jury decision making
in criminal and civil cases).
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF OBJECTIVE CHANCES AS A NON-CHARACTER
THEORY OF LOGICAL RELEVANCE
Part I discusses non-character theories in broad brush fashion.
This part hones in on a specific non-character theory-the doc-
trine of objective chances.
A. The Landmark English and American Decisions Recognizing
the Doctrine of Chances
One of the seminal English decisions on the doctrine is the
celebrated case of Rex v. Smith." The accused, George Smith, had
gone through a marriage ceremony with a woman named Bessie
Mundy. 3 She had inherited a large sum of money from her fa-
ther. 4 Bessie was later discovered drowned in her own bathtub. 5
The defendant claimed that the death was accidental; he stated
that he had no involvement in the death. 6 The prosecution of-
fered uncharged misconduct evidence to rebut the defendant's
claim. 7 The testimony was to the effect that two other women the
accused had purportedly married "were . . . found drowned in
their baths in houses where they were living with" the accused.8
The defense contended that the testimony constituted blatantly
inadmissible bad character evidence. Nevertheless, the trial judge
admitted the testimony. 9
On appeal, Smith challenged the trial judge's ruling. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial judge's decision.90 The court
agreed with Smith that the prosecution could not introduce the
evidence to show the defendant's personal bad character and to
then invite the jury to treat that character as proof that he had
perpetrated the charged murder.91 However, the court held that
82. 84 L.J.KB. 2153 (Crim. App. 1915); see Similar Fact Evidence, supra note 24, at
77-78; Rothstein, supra note 43, at 1260-61.
83. Rex, 84 L.J.KIB. at 2153.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2154.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2157.
91. Id. at 2156.
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the evidence was properly admissible to shed light "upon the
question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged
in the indictment were designed or accidental."92 The court's rea-
soning focused on the objective improbability of so many similar
accidents befalling Smith.93 Either Smith was one of the unlucki-
est persons alive, or one or some of the deaths in question were
the product of an actus reus.94
The Introduction to this article discussed the Woods decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That
decision essentially imported the Smith doctrine into the United
States. In its brief in Woods, the government explicitly cited
Smith as authority.95 Although the defense brief characterized
Smith as "divergent"96 and "mischie [vous]," 9' the Court of Appeals
accepted Smith as persuasive authority.9" In the majority opinion,
Judge Winter echoed Smith. As in Smith, Judge Winter reaf-
firmed the character evidence prohibition. 99 He noted that "Itihe
government and the defendant agree that evidence of other
crimes is not admissible to prove that an accused is a bad person
and therefore likely to have committed the crime in question."'1°
Although Woods antedated the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,10 1 Judge Winter embraced the inclusionary conception
of the distinction between character and non-character theories,
stating that "evidence of other offenses may be received, if rele-
vant, for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime."102
92. Id.
93. See ZELMAN COWEN & P.B. CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 138 (1956);
RUPERT CROSS & NANCY WILKINS, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 233-34 (6th ed.
1986)); RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 92-93 (2d ed. 1983).
94. See D.W. Elliott, The Young Person's Guide to Similar Fact Evidence-I, 1983
CRIM. L. REV. 284, 289.
95. See Appellee's Brief at 51, United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973)
(No. 72-2217).
96. Reply Brief of Appellant at 133 n.8, Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (No. 72-2217).
97. Id.
98. Woods, 484 F.2d at 127, 133 n.8.
99. Id. at 133.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 134 n.9 (referring to "[tihe proposed Federal Rules of Evidence"). The
Rules would take effect two years later. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING
MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE & STATUTES 16 (5th ed. 2002).
102. Woods, 484 F.2d at 134.
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The prosecution did not have to "fit[]"' 0° its evidence into a recog-
nized "pigeonhol[el."104
In the body of his opinion, Judge Winter characterized the doc-
trine of chances as a non-character theory. In his view, without
positing any assumption about Martha's personal, subjective bad
character, the evidence shed light on "the unlikelihood" that so
many children in Martha's custody would "accidentall1y]" suffer
cyanotic episodes. °5 It struck Judge Winter as an extraordinary
coincidence that "so many children at defendant's mercy experi-
enced this condition."10 6
B. The Theory of Logical Relevance Underlying the Doctrine of
Objective Chances
Figure 1 in Part I of this article diagrammed the forbidden
character theory of logical relevance. Figure 2 depicts the doctrine
of chances:o 7
FIGURE 2
THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES AS A
NON-CHARACTER THEORY
THE ITEM OF EVIDENCE
The defendant's other misdeeds
THE INTERMEDIATE INFERENCE
The objective improbability of so many accidents
(an extraordinary coincidence exceeding the ordinary
incidece)
THE FINAL CONCLUSION
One or some of the incidents were not accidents.
103. Id. at 133.
104. Id. at 134.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 4:01 fig. 4-2; see also
People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 128 n.35 (Mich. 1993), opinion amended, 520
N.W.2d 338 (Mich. 1994) (citing with approval the discussion in UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE).
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, the doctrine of chances differs at
least superficially from a character theory of logical relevance.
Initially, under the doctrine the proponent does not offer the evi-
dence of the uncharged misconduct to establish an intermediate
inference as to the defendant's personal, subjective bad charac-
ter.'l 8 Rather, the proponent offers the evidence to establish the
objective improbability of so many accidents befalling the defen-
dant or the defendant becoming innocently enmeshed in suspi-
cious circumstances so frequently.0 9 The proponent must estab-
lish that, together with the uncharged incident, the charged
incident would represent an extraordinary coincidence.110 In some
cases, that will be obvious. Smith is a case in point. In a fact
situation such as Smith, the jury hardly needs an expert's testi-
mony to appreciate that, on average, finding one's spouse
drowned in the family bathtub is at most a "'once in a lifetime'
experience."1 In other cases, though, the proponent may need to
introduce independent evidence to establish the ordinary inci-
dence of the type of event in which the defendant was involved."2
Like the intermediate inference, the final conclusion under the
doctrine of chances differs from the ultimate conclusion in charac-
ter reasoning. If the jury finds the requisite extraordinary coinci-
dence under the doctrine of chances, the proponent may invite the
jury to finally conclude that, as a matter of common sense, the co-
incidence is evidence that one or some of the incidents were not
accidents. Under the doctrine, the final inference is a very limited
conclusion. The final conclusion is not that all the incidents were
the product of an actus reus or mens rea. Rather, the final infer-
ence is merely that one or some of the incidents were not acci-
dents." '3 The doctrine posits that some incidents can and, in the
normal course of events, do occur accidentally. Moreover, there is
nothing about the internal logic of the doctrine which singles out
the charged incident as the product of an actus reus or mens
108. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 4:01.
109. See VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d at 128-29, 129 n.38.
110. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Mis-
conduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evi-
dence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 590-92 (1990) [hereinafter The Doctrines].
111. Cf. id. at 598 ("[T]he inadvertent possession of illicit drugs or stolen property is
probably a 'once in a lifetime' experience for an innocent person.").
112. See id. at 590-92.
113. See Kyser, supra note 15, at 541-42.
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rea.114 At most, all that the doctrine establishes is that one or
some of the incidents were probably the product of an actus reus
or mens rea.
The doctrine of chances not only comes to a different final con-
clusion than a character theory; the doctrine also takes a differ-
ent route to its final conclusion. Under a character theory, the
second inference entails using the defendant's subjective charac-
ter as a predictor of conduct.1 5 The second inference under the
doctrine of chances is quite different. At trial, the litigants pre-
sent the jury with at least two competing hypotheses: one that all
the incidents are accidents, and the other that one or some of the
incidents were not accidents. When a jury is presented with com-
peting versions of the events, the jury is expected to use its com-
mon sense to gauge the relative plausibility of the versions. 1 6 In
many jurisdictions, the pattern jury instructions both authorize
and encourage the petit jurors to use their common sense in
choosing among the competing hypotheses advanced by the liti-
gants. "'7
In this light, it becomes clear that the doctrine is not merely
superficially different than a character theory. Far more impor-
114. See id.; see also 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 9:88.
115. See Kyser, supra note 15, at 537.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe
trier of fact is entitled to employ common sense in making reasonable inferences . . .");
United States v. Hamie, 165 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1999) ("'[I]n ... choosing from among
competing inferences, jurors are entitled to take full advantage of their collective experi-
ence and common sense.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 14
F.3d 703, 708 (1st Cir. 1994))); United States v. Gainey, 111 F.3d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1997)
("In evaluating the facts of a case, the law permits jurors to 'apply their common knowl-
edge, observations and experiences in the affairs of life.' . . . [Jlurors may use 'common
sense,' derived from the repetitive pattern of human behavior and experiences common to
all of us.. . ." (quoting United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.3d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985)
(en banc))); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 782 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that jurors
.are not expected to resist common sense inferences based on the realities of human ex-
perience"); United States v. Donovan, 24 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W~e expect jurors
to draw on their experience as well as their common sense to draw reasonable inferences.
.. ."), affd, No. 95-2720, 104 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision); United
States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1993) (commenting that "[j]uries are free to
use their common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained
in the ordinary affairs of life" to choose among competing potential inferences from the cir-
cumstantial evidence).
117. See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS: CRIMINAL § 12.02, at 130 (5th ed. 2000) ("You are expected to use your good sense in
considering and evaluating the evidence in the case.... [Glive the evidence a reasonable
... construction in the light of your common knowledge of the natural tendencies and in-
clinations of human beings.").
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tantly, the doctrine is distinguishable from a character theory in
terms of the policies which inspire the character prohibition.118
First, while a true character theory forces the jurors to con-
sciously address the question of the type or kind of person the de-
fendant is, there is no such necessity under the doctrine. Thus,
the doctrine reduces the risk that the jurors will in effect penalize
the defendant because of his or her status. The judge's instruction
on the doctrine should expressly direct the jurors that they may
not treat the uncharged evidence as proof of the defendant's per-
sonal bad character.119 It is true that it might occur to an individ-
ual juror that the evidence is also logically relevant on a charac-
ter theory and to vote against the defendant for that reason.
However, under the doctrine there is much less risk that that
probative danger will materialize. The instruction on the doctrine
not only does not compel the jurors to focus on the defendant's
character or disposition; the instruction ought to bluntly tell them
not to do so. Thus, the doctrine creates a markedly lower danger
of misdecision.
Second, the doctrine presents less risk of overvaluation of the
evidence. As Part I explained, that risk can be acute when the
jury must use the defendant's character as a predictor of conduct
on a specific occasion. However, under the doctrine the final in-
ferential step is different. The doctrine does not ask the jurors to
utilize the defendant's propensity as the basis for a prediction of
conduct on the alleged occasion. Instead, the doctrine asks the ju-
rors to consider the objective improbability of a coincidence in as-
sessing the plausibility of a defendant's claim that a loss was the
product of an accident or that he or she was accidentally en-
meshed in suspicious circumstances. This common sense mode of
reasoning is not only legitimate; indeed, the pattern jury charges
in many jurisdictions urge the jurors to resort to precisely that
type of reasoning.
118. See generally 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 4:01.
119. See 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, §§ 9:71-:73.
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III. THE RECENT ATTACKS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF CHANCES AS A NON-CHARACTER THEORY
A. The Early General Attacks on the Character Evidence
Prohibition
In the early 1980s, two highly respected Evidence commenta-
tors, Professor Richard Kuhns and the late Professor H. Richard
Uviller, released thoughtful, general critiques of the character
evidence prohibition.
Professor Kuhns published his critique in 1981.120 Professor
Kuhns did not contend that all of the recognized, purportedly
non-character theories in fact rely on propensity inferences. He
wrote:
In a relatively small number of cases in which specific acts evi-
dence is offered, the relevance of the evidence arguably is not de-
pendent on a propensity inference. Consider, for example, a murder
prosecution in which the state's theory is that the victim was killed
with a .38-caliber pistol, and the prosecutor offers to prove that two
days prior to the murder the defendant stole such a pistol....
The evidence.., is admittedly relevant in a propensity sense. The
factfinder might infer that people who steal guns have a propensity
to murder .... The relevance of the evidence, however, is not de-
pendent upon the[] propensity inference. Mere possession of the
weapon shows the ability of the murder defendant to commit the
homicide....
If [the] evidence . . . is offered solely to show that the defendant
had the ability to commit the crime .... [the] evidence ... fall[s] out-
side the propensity prohibition.
121
However, Professor Kuhns argued that on close scrutiny, in
many instances in which the courts admitted evidence on pur-
portedly non-character theories, there are implicit propensity in-
ferences.122 In some cases, the logical relevance of the evidence
depends on a generalized inference about the propensities of a
category of persons.'23 For example, courts routinely admit "con-
sciousness of guilt"124 evidence that a defendant attempted to ob-
120. Kuhns, supra note 45.
121. Id. at 792.
122. See id. at 803.
123. See id. at 785-89.
124. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 3:04.
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struct justice by threatening or bribing a witness.125 The logical
relevance of the evidence turns on the validity of the assumption
that, as a class, guilty persons have a propensity to obstruct jus-
tice to avoid the consequences of their guilt.126 However, if the es-
sential propensity inference relates to a class of persons rather
than the individual defendant, then there may be somewhat less
risk of misdecision, since the theory does not compel the jury to
focus on the type or sort of person the individual defendant is. Ac-
cording to Professor Kuhns, in other cases, the logical relevance
of the evidence depends on a propensity inference, but the pro-
pensity concerns morally neutral conduct.'27 Professor Kuhns
pointed out that when knowledge is at issue in drug prosecutions,
the courts frequently accept evidence of the defendant's involve-
ment in prior drug trafficking.'28 There is a propensity inference,
but the inference is merely that "[a] person who has obtained
knowledge of some fact has a propensity to retain that knowl-
edge."' 29 Here too, the nature of the propensity inference reduces
the risk of misdecision. There is less danger that the propensity
inference itself will cause the jury to find the defendant repulsive
and convict despite the existence of reasonable doubt as to the de-
fendant's guilt of the charged offense. In Professor Kuhns's view,
in still other cases, the logical relevance of the evidence depends
on an individualized propensity to engage in morally blamewor-
thy conduct.'3 ° These cases pose the gravest probative dangers.
The theory of relevance compels the jury to advert to the defen-
dant's personal, subjective character traits; and worse still, the
character trait concerns immoral, potentially repugnant conduct.
Although Professor Kuhns surveyed many of the leading non-
character theories, he did not comment about the doctrine of
chances. He twice cited Woods, but he neither singled out the doc-
trine nor ventured an opinion as to whether it is a legitimate non-
character theory. 3' That oversight was understandable, though,
since at the time of Professor Kuhns's article the doctrine was
just emerging in American case law as a non-character theory.
125. See Kuhns, supra note 45, at 787.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 779.
128. See id. at 790.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 779, 790, 794.
131. See id. at 780 n.ll, 800 n.100.
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His bottom line, though, was a call for the abolition of the distinc-
tion between character and non-character theories.'32 He con-
cluded that propensity evidence ought to be acceptable, subject to
discretionary exclusion under Rule 403.33
In 1982, Professor H. Richard Uviller published his general cri-
tique of the character prohibition.134 The principal thrust of his
critique differed from that of Professor Kuhns' attack on the pro-
hibition. The starting point for Professor Uviller's main line of his
argument was the contention that the common understanding is
that character is probative of conduct.3 5 Professor Uviller then
asserted that intellectual honesty demands recognizing that the
limiting instructions, attempting to confine the jury's considera-
tion of evidence of bad acts to non-character uses, are largely inef-
fective. 36 As he colorfully put it, such a limiting instruction "does
more to satisfy legal scholasticism than to direct the minds of real
jurors." "' "To the ordinary human mind,... the division between
the prescribed and the proscribed uses [of the uncharged miscon-
duct evidence] may be a bit difficult to perceive." 38 The limiting
instruction is "arcane legalistic wordplay."
1 39
Although Professor Uviller's article had a different central fo-
cus than Professor Kuhns's, Professor Uviller did touch in passing
upon the question of whether all the evidence purportedly admit-
ted for "special purposes" possesses genuine non-character rele-
vance. 4 ° Professor Uviller cited Professor Kuhns's earlier arti-
cle.' 4 ' Like Professor Kuhns, Professor Uviller asserted that the
courts often admit evidence of disposition or propensity under a
different name.42 He stated that the distinction between charac-
ter and non-character theories is "illusory ... at its core."43 His
analysis of that issue was not as extended as Professor Kuhns's,
132. See id. at 803-04.
133. See id. at 805, 810.
134. See Uviller, supra note 42.
135. See id. at 848, 883-84.
136. See id. at 877 (discussing the "special purpose" exception).
137. Id. at 869; see also id. at 880.
138. Id. at 879.
139. Id. at 890.
140. Id. at 877.
141. See id. at 850 n.13.
142. See id. at 885.
143. See id. at 869.
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but Professor Uviller appeared to largely concur with Professor
Kuhns.
There is a further parallel to Professor Kuhns's article. Like
Professor Kuhns, Professor Uviller stopped short of explicitly
challenging the doctrine of chances. Even in footnotes, he did not
mention Woods. He did, however, comment on one fact situation
where the doctrine of chances comes into play modernly.'" The
courts frequently rely on the doctrine in prosecutions for the
knowing receipt of stolen goods.'45 The doctrine of chances argu-
ment is that, although an innocent person might accidentally
come into the possession of stolen property, it is objectively
unlikely that the same innocent person will unwittingly do so on
multiple occasions.46 In his article, Professor Uviller mentions
such a fact situation. 47 On the one hand, he does not expressly
argue that in such cases the logical relevance of the evidence de-
pends on a propensity inference. On the other hand, he argues
that in such cases, there is a substantial risk that the jurors will
be unable or unwilling to observe a limiting instruction confining
the evidence to a non-character use.'"
B. The More Specific Attacks on the Doctrine of Chances within
the Past Decade
Although the attacks by Professors Kuhns and Uviller on the
character prohibition were both cogent and forceful, they had lit-
tle immediate impact. However, they set the stage for later at-
tacks specifically targeting the doctrine of chances. The subse-
quent attacks took the form of three articles. These articles were
all published within the past decade--coinciding with the legisla-
tive efforts to selectively abolish the character evidence prohibi-
tion in prosecutions and civil actions involving allegations of sex-
ual assault and child molestation.
149
144. Id. at 879. For a more recent statement of many of Professor Uviller's arguments,
see Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's Crminal History: The Trouble with Rule
404(b), 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 201 (2005).
145. 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, §§ 5:28-:29.
146. Id. § 5:28.
147. See Uviller, supra note 42, at 879.
148. Id. at 882.
149. See FED. R. EvID. 413-15. The statutes took effect on July 9, 1995. See id.
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The first article was released by Professor Paul Rothstein, the
former chair of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice
Section's Committee on Rules of Evidence and Criminal Proce-
dure.5 ° Like Professors Kuhns and Uviller, Professor Rothstein
states that a theory lacks legitimate non-character relevance if
the theory depends on a propensity inference. 1 ' He acknowledges
that Dean Wigmore had championed the doctrine of chances as a
non-character theory.'52 Wigmore believed that "the doctrine pro-
vides a way to infer guilt from the multiplicity of offenses ...
without relying on ... propensity reasoning."5 ' However, Profes-
sor Rothstein parts company with Wigmore over the doctrine. To
critique the doctrine, Professor Rothstein turns to the Smith
prosecution-the "Brides of the Bath" case."54 He flatly asserts
that, in reality, the Smith court admitted the uncharged evidence
on a propensity theory. 155 He declares that "[iut is inescapable"
that the theory rests on a propensity inference. 5 6 In Professor
Rothstein's view, the evidence lacks logical relevance unless one
at least implicitly assumes that the defendant has a propensity to
repeat the crime.'57
The second attack was mounted in 1998 by a practitioner, Mr.
Andrew Morris, writing in The Review of Litigation."' Mr. Morris
specifically cites the preceding articles by Professors Kuhns 5 9 and
Rothstein. 160 Drawing on those articles, he analyzes the doctrine
of chances in depth. He notes that the doctrine has a certain
common sense appeal:
Consider repeated flips of a coin. On any given flip (or "trial") there
is a 50/50 chance that a coin will land heads. The probability of two
consecutive flips both turning up heads is 50% x 50%, which equals
25%, or 1 in 4. For four flips, the probability that the result will be
150. Rothstein, supra note 43, at 1259.
151. See id. at 1260.
152. See id. at 1262 & n.19.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1260-61.
155. Id. at 1261.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1262, 1264.
158. See Morris, supra note 34.
159. Id. at 189 n.33.
160. Id. at 189 n.33, 200 n.73, 201 n.75. Mr. Morris states that "Professor Rothstein
appears to agree with my conclusion, although he does not spell out his rationale." Id. at
200 n.73.
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heads every time is 50% x 50% x 50% x 50%, which equals 6.25%, or
1 in 16. The upshot is that solid mathematical ground exists for our
intuition that, at some point, we suspect that someone who repeat-
edly flips a coin that turns up heads is not merely relying on chance;
she has a trick coin.
161
Yet, Mr. Morris believes that the doctrine of chances is flawed
as a non-character theory. Mr. Morris states that the published
opinions relying on the doctrine fail to explain why the evidence
possesses non-character relevance.'62 He asserts that, in truth,
the evidence lacks any logical relevance unless one assumes that
the defendant has a "constant,"163 "continuing,"'164 and "unchang-
ing"'6 5 character "across time."' 6 The only possible conclusions
open to the jury are that all the incidents were accidents or inten-
tional misdeeds. 67 In Mr. Morris's view, a "mixed set[]"-the as-
sumption that some incidents were accidents but others were
crimes-is not relevant to reduce the "chance of accident." 68 The
uncharged misconduct is relevant to "decrease[U the probability of
accident only if we assume that ... every event is intentional."6 9
For the uncharged incidents to be relevant, "we assume that all of
the outcomes are alike. This requires the assumption of continu-
ity of character, or classic propensity reasoning."'70 "In the end,"
"we cannot dislodge propensity from [the] center" of the logic of
the doctrine of chances.' 7 '
Although Mr. Morris does not cite Professor Uviller's article,
near the end of his article Mr. Morris makes an alternative ar-
gument reminiscent of Professor Uviller's thesis. In a footnote,
Mr. Morris declares:
Even if... the use of the doctrine of chances to eliminate the odds
of an accident did not involve propensity reasoning, it bears such
close similarity to propensity reasoning that we could not seriously
have faith that limiting instructions could prevent a jury from cross-
161. Id. at 193.
162. See id. at 191.
163. Id. at 194, 201.
164. Id. at 195, 201; see also id. at 199 ("continuity of character").
165. Id. at 201.
166. Id. at 194.
167. See id. at 203.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 201.
170. Id. at 203.
171. Id. at 192, 203.
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ing over the thin line between eliminating the probability of accident
and directly reasoning about propensity. As a result, evidence used
on this theory would often fall to the Rule 403 balancing test.
172
The articles by Professor Rothstein and Mr. Morris concentrate
on the use of the doctrine of chances in the criminal setting. In
contrast, the most recent article attacking the doctrine discusses
the use of the doctrine in civil rights discrimination cases. The ar-
ticle is a 2005 student note by Ms. Lisa Marshall. 173 The note re-
flects a comprehensive review of the prior literature, replete with
citations to the articles by Professors Kuhns 174 and Uviller 75 and
Mr. Morris. 76 Ms. Marshall's concern is that the rigorous en-
forcement of the character evidence prohibition in civil rights ac-
tions will frustrate the enforcement of those laws.177 She points
out that given the dearth of other evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, civil rights plaintiffs often desperately need to introduce tes-
timony about a defendant's other discriminatory acts.' She adds
that in many cases, the civil rights plaintiffs only hope of ration-
alizing the introduction of the testimony is an invocation of the
doctrine of chances. 79
Like Mr. Morris, Ms. Marshall concedes that, at first blush, the
doctrine of chances is an attractive option. 8 0 It appears to have a
sound statistical basis."8 ' Indeed, courts routinely permit plain-
tiffs to introduce statistical evidence to lay a foundation for invok-
ing the doctrine:
[C]ourts encourage plaintiffs alleging discrimination to introduce
statistics demonstrating the "degree of disparity between the ex-
pected and actual . . .composition of the [workforce] necessary to
support an inference of discrimination.".. .Any "degree of disparity"
is... probative of the ultimate issue in a disparate treatment case-
the intention of the employer at the time she made the relevant em-
ployment decision ....
172. Id. at 200 n.74.
173. See Marshall, supra note 20.
174. Id. at 1097 n.131.
175. Id. at 1083 n.64.
176. Id. at 1072 n.30.
177. Id. at 1065-66.
178. See id. at 1066, 1083.
179. See id. at 1080-82.
180. See id. at 1081.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 1080-81 (alteration in original) (quoting Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced
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However, Ms. Marshall believes that the courts' reliance on the
doctrine of chances in these cases is misplaced because ultimately
the doctrine fails as a non-character theory.'83 The critical ques-
tion is "how the evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no
link of which may be the inference that the defendant has the
propensity to commit" the alleged misdeed.'84 Like Professor
Rothstein and Mr. Morris, Ms. Marshall professes that she can-
not discern any relevance in doctrine of chances cases unless one
posits the defendant's character. 85 The "logic that underlies" even
statistical evidence is "propensity-based."'8 6 The evidence is ut-
terly irrelevant unless one assumes that the defendant employer
has "some enduring propensity to act in a given way" across
time.
87
These attacks on the doctrine of chances come at a critical
point in the history of the character evidence prohibition. As pre-
viously stated, in a number of jurisdictions, the opponents of the
prohibition have already persuaded the legislatures to selectively
repeal the prohibition in certain types of prosecutions and civil
cases. 88 The next step, of course, would be a wholesale abolition
of the doctrine. The attacks on the doctrine of chances pave the
way for that step. As we have seen, the testimony admitted under
the doctrine has become vital in child abuse cases, drug prosecu-
tions, and civil rights actions.189 Many laypersons would regard it
as an "affront to common sense" to bar such evidence.' 90 However,
if the doctrine of chances runs afoul of the character evidence
prohibition, intellectual honesty demands that the courts discon-
tinue invoking the doctrine to justify the introduction of the evi-
dence. Of course, that outcome could well result in the exclusion
of this vital evidence, miscarriages of justice, and the consequent
frustration of the compelling public policies underlying the child
abuse, drug trafficking, and civil rights laws. The ultimate de-
nouement could easily be a legislative decision that the character
evidence prohibition itself must yield. Like Dickens's Mr. Bumble,
Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
183. See id. at 1081.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 1071-72.
186. Id. at 1081.
187. Id. at 1080-81.
188. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
190. R. v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421, 456 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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legislators might react that "[ilf the [character evidence] law sup-
poses that, . . . the law is a[n] ass" and must be jettisoned.191 In
short, at this juncture in the history of the character evidence
rule, it is critical to decide whether the attacks on the doctrine of
chances have merit.
IV. THE FALLACIES IN THE ATTACKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF
CHANCES
To make that decision, we must painstakingly dissect the chain
of inferences underlying the doctrine of chances.
A. The Theoretical Distinction Between the Doctrine and a
Character Theory of Logical Relevance
Whether we work forward from the starting point of the chain
of reasoning or backward from the final conclusion under the doc-
trine, we reach the same conclusion: The doctrine of chances is a
legitimate non-character theory.
1. Working Forward Toward the Final Conclusion in the Doctrine
In his article, Mr. Morris points out that proponents frequently
offer statistical evidence to prove up doctrine of chances claims.1 92
In her note, Ms. Marshall states that, more fundamentally, the
claim is statistical in nature. 93 The claim is based on the dispar-
ity between the expected and actual values:' 94 How many inci-
dents would we expect the average person to be involved in, and
how many incidents was the defendant involved in? Ms. Marshall
observes that these claims are often made in civil rights cases al-
leging discrimination.195
191. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 520 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941) (1838) (internal
quotes omitted).
192. See Morris, supra note 34, at 194-95.
193. See Marshall, supra note 20, at 1080-81; see also Leonard, supra note 50, at 161(stating that the doctrine of chances "is based on informal probability reasoning").
194. See Marshall, supra note 20, at 1080-81.
195. See id. at 1080 ("[Sltatistical analyses . . . are common in discrimination suits.
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The popularity of such claims in discrimination suits is under-
standable. In one of the leading Supreme Court decisions on jury
discrimination, Castaneda v. Partida,9 6 the Court approved the
use of this mode of reasoning to establish discriminatory ani-
mus.197 A foremost American authority on statistical evidence,
Professor David Barnes, has reconstructed the Castaneda Court's
reasoning.19 As he describes the reasoning process, the Casta-
neda analysis includes the following steps, inter alia:
- Find the number of the allegedly discriminated-against group
you would expect to find on the jury panel if there were no dis-
crimination.
- Find the number of the allegedly discriminated-against group
who were actually included on the jury panel.
- Compute the disparity between the two numbers.
- Determine the probability that random chance could account
for the disparity.199
This process is a species of hypothesis testing. The hypothesis
is that there was no discrimination in selecting the panel and
that innocent random chance accounts for the panel's composi-
tion. The statistician next determines the number of minority
panelists that would be expected if the hypothesis were true. The
statistician then ascertains the actual number of minority panel-
ists and compares that number to the expected value. If that dis-
parity is significant enough,2 °0 it leads to the rejection of the hy-
pothesis of random chance. 01
196. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
197. See id. at 496; DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF
QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 91-92 (1983).
198. See BARNES, supra note 197, at 91-92; 1 PAUL C. GIANELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 15-5(A), at 689-90, Matthew Bender & Co. (3d ed.,
1999).
199. BARNES, supra note 197, at 91-92; 1 GIANELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 198, §
15-5(A), at 689-90.
200. The question is not simply the absolute size of the disparity. In a jury discrimina-
tion case, its significance also depends upon the total size of the jury pool. BARNES, supra
note 197, at 92.
201. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977) ("[Ilf the difference
between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three stan-
dard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect
to a social scientist.").
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The critics of the doctrine of chances assert that this type of
statistical reasoning is "propensity-based."2 °2 They agree that the
test of whether a chain of logical inferences is propensity-based is
whether it necessarily entails an inference as to the defendant's
personal, subjective bad character.2"3 They must therefore mean
that if we eliminate the possibility of random chance, the only
remaining logical route to the conclusion of fault requires an in-
ference that the defendant's propensity prompted the defendant
to form the wrongful intent.20 4 If that were not the case and there
were an alternative route, the theory would not be "propensity-
based."205
Thus, the question arises: If innocent, random chance does not
account for the disparity between the expected and actual values,
is the only alternative explanation the assumption that the per-
son's character traits prompted the person to engage in criminal
or discriminatory conduct causing the disparity? On reflection,
the answer is "No." The critics of the doctrine assume that if we
eliminate random chance as an explanation, the only logical way
to connect the outcome (so many deaths, involvements, or adverse
actions against minorities) to the conclusion of wrongful conduct
or intent is to posit the explanation that the person has a propen-
sity for that conduct or intent. That assumption is false.
The assumption rests on a simplistic determinist view of hu-
man behavior. To be sure, a person's genetic background, envi-
ronment, and characteristics influence a person's behavior.20 6
However, consistent with Western philosophic tradition, for the
202. E.g., Marshall, supra note 20, at 1081.
203. See, e.g., id. at 1071-72 (citing Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 191 (3d
Cir. 2000)).
204. See, e.g., id. Of course, that inference is one possible route to the ultimate conclu-
sion of fault. However, as previously stated, admissible uncharged misconduct is almost
always logically relevant on two theories: (1) a forbidden character theory; and (2) a per-
missible non-character theory. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The existence of
the first potential theory does not require the exclusion of the evidence. See supra notes
63-64 and accompanying text. Rather, the typical solution is to admit the evidence on the-
ory (2) but give the jury a limiting instruction under Federal Rule of Evidence 105 to for-
bid the jury from relying on theory (1). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
205. See Marshall, supra note 20, at 1081.
206. See generally D.H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research & Criminal DNA Data-
bases (2005) (a study funded by the U.S. Department of Energy) (on file in Professor Im-
winkelried's office), available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-kayed/pubs/genlaw/05-
LCP-behav.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005); Lisa Schriner Lewis, Note, The Role Genetic
Information Plays in the Criminal Justice System, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 519 (2005) (examining
behavioral genetics and exhibiting its potential application in the criminal justice process).
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most part American law assumes that persons are autonomous
2 °7
human beings possessed of volitional capacity. 2°8 That is, they
possess free will.209 A person may have characteristics predispos-
ing him or her to act in a certain way, but situationally the per-
son can make a choice contrary to the character trait. For exam-
ple, even if a person has a propensity toward criminal conduct, in
a given case the deterrent effect of the criminal law might be so
strong that she makes an ad hoc choice to refrain from commit-
ting a crime.210 Conversely, even if a person has a propensity to-
ward lawful conduct, in a given case she might encounter a tre-
mendous temptation and make a situational choice to perpetrate
a crime.
Consider Mr. Morris's example of the four consecutive coin
flips, all yielding heads.2" He seems to think that the only logi-
cally possible explanations for the outcome are: (1) random
chance was at work; and (2) the person flipping has a propensity
to cheat.212 He asserts that if we discount random chance, the evi-
dence is logically relevant "only by assuming that the defendant's
character remains constant across time."2 1 3 That assertion is
plainly wrong. There are at least four logically possible explana-
tions for the outcome: (1) random chance was at work; (2) the per-
son flipping has a propensity to cheat, causing him to cheat on all
five occasions; (3) although the person flipping has no propensity
to cheat, on all five occasions the person made a situational choice
to cheat; and (4) in Mr. Morris's terminology, a "mixed set[]"
2 4
-
random chance accounts for some of the flips that resulted in
heads, and on the remaining flips the person made a free, situ-
ational choice to cheat.
Explanations (3) and (4) are potential explanations for the per-
son's conduct. Consider explanation (3). Prior to the occasion
when the person flipped the coin, the person may have lived a
207. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988)
(taking an in-depth look at the concept of autonomy, the values behind it, and the various
roles it plays in different spheres of life).
208. See MORTIMER J. ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS 141-42, 152, 164 (1981).
209. See id.
210. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a), at 28-29 (4th ed. 2003).
211. See Morris, supra note 34, at 193.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 194.
214. Id. at 203.
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saintly life, displaying no propensity at all toward criminal or
immoral conduct. However, just before the occasion, her child was
diagnosed with a serious illness, she learned that the cost of her
child's medical care would be astronomical, and her insurance
company informed her that it would not cover the expenses. Even
if she had no disposition or character trait to cheat, the person
might make a situational choice to cheat on the occasion in ques-
tion. In addition, consider possibility (4). A friend bets the person
that she cannot attain heads on five consecutive flips. The person
realizes that she has little chance to win the bet. The odds
against her are so long that she makes the bet almost as a lark.
Surprisingly, when she fairly flips the coin the first three times,
by random chance each flip yields a head. Before the fourth flip,
she is shocked to realize that she has a realistic chance of win-
ning the bet. At that point, she decides to cheat and does so on
the fourth and fifth flips. Significantly, neither explanation (3)
nor explanation (4) necessarily entails an inference that the per-
son has a pre-existing character trait or disposition to cheat. Ex-
planation (3) involves entirely situational choices, and (4) is a mix
of random chance and situational choice.
If there are potential explanations that do not rest on propen-
sity inferences, then the remaining question is this: Does disproof
of the hypothesis of random chance increase the probability of
those explanations? If it does, uncharged misconduct discrediting
the chance hypothesis is logically relevant without positing a pro-
pensity inference.
The doctrine of chances theory is an example of reasoning by
process of elimination. The proponent uses the theory to elimi-
nate random chance as an explanation for the set of outcomes.
Process-of-elimination is a valid mode of logical reasoning. It was
a favorite of Sherlock Holmes, that most logical of investigators,
that "when you have eliminated the [other possibilities], what-
ever remains, however improbable, must be the truth."215 More to
the point, the courts permit lay jurors to utilize process-of-
elimination reasoning.216 In many jurisdictions, in proceedings
such as toxic tort cases, the plaintiff may introduce testimony
215. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE SIGN OF FOUR 60 (Broadview
Press 2001) (1890).
216. See Wendy Michelle Ertmer, Note, Just What the Doctor Ordered: The Admissibil-
ity of Differential Diagnosis in Pharmaceutical Product Litigation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1227,
1228 (2003).
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about differential diagnosis or etiology to establish the nature of
the plaintiffs illness or its causation.217 This type of expert testi-
mony is reducible to process-of-elimination reasoning.218
However, what exactly does the process-of-elimination reason-
ing prove? Negatively, it serves as a basis for discounting or
eliminating one explanation for the outcomes, but that is not
enough. To satisfy the logical relevance standard codified in Rule
401,219 the evidence must do more. To wit, it must affirmatively
increase the probability of at least one of the remaining possibili-
ties. In a doctrine of chances case, if the evidence is to be admit-
ted on a non-character theory, the negative elimination of the
random chance hypothesis must affirmatively increase the prob-
ability of one of the alternative explanations which do not entail a
propensity inference. In Mr. Morris's coin flipping hypothetical,
the elimination of explanation (1) (entirely random chance) would
have to increase the probability of explanation (3) (all situational
choices) or explanation (4) (a mix of random chance and situ-
ational choices).
It is submitted that in the typical case, the negative disproof of
the random chance hypothesis will have that affirmative effect.
Assume that there are four logically possible explanations. At the
outset of the investigation, there is no data rendering one expla-
nation more probable than another. In that event, the only non-
arbitrary choice would be to assign the same probability to each
explanation and treat each hypothesis as equally probable. If
there were four possibilities, as in the coin flipping hypothetical,
each hypothesis would be assigned a twenty-five percent probabil-
ity. What happens, though, when process-of-elimination reason-
ing enables the statistician to eliminate one of the four hypothe-
ses? For instance, what happens if statistical evidence of the
disparity between the expected and actual values leads to a rejec-
tion of explanation (1) (entirely random chance)? If, at this point,
there is still no data justifying a preference among the remaining
217. See Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 262 (6th Cir. 2001); Smith v.
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 684, 695-97 (W.D.N.C. 2003); Jean Macchiaroli
Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of
Daubert, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 369, 402-03 (2001). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About Differential Diagnosis (Etiology):
Of Under- and Over-Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391 (2004).
218. See Gary Sloboda, Differential Diagnosis or Distortion?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 301, 303
(2001).
219. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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hypotheses, each of those probabilities must be reassigned. More
specifically, the probability of each remaining candidate explana-
tion would have to be increased. If there are now only three re-
maining potential explanations and they are equally probable,
then each should be assigned a probability of 33 1/3%. Thus, by
negatively eliminating the explanation that random chance ac-
counts for the outcome of all four flips, the doctrine of chances
evidence increases the probability of explanations (3) and (4), nei-
ther of which entails a propensity inference.
A caveat is necessary. Atypical cases are conceivable. Suppose,
for example, that empirical epidemiological research establishes
that the risk of a certain illness is a constant. On that supposi-
tion, the disproof of a competing explanation or diagnosis would
not increase the probability of the constant risk. However, such
cases will undoubtedly be rare. Indeed, research has revealed no
doctrine of chances case in which the record of trial included any-
thing approaching empirical proof of a fixed risk. Absent such
data, the negative disproof of the random chance hypothesis af-
firmatively increases the probability of the alternative explana-
tions which do not rest on a propensity inference. As Figure 3 in-
dicates, the doctrine of chances evidence is hence logically
relevant on a non-character theory, satisfying both Rule 401 and
the second sentence of Rule 404(b).
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FIGURE 3
THE REASONING PROCESS UNDERLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF CHANCES
THE STARTING POINT
An identification of all the explanatory hypotheses for the
outcomes, including the explanation that random chance
accounts for all the outcomes and any hypotheses that the
person's situational choice accounts for one or some of the
outcomes
THE ELIMINATION OF THE RANDOM CHANCE
HYPOTHESIS
By demonstrating an extraordinary coincidence, the doctrine
of chance leads negatively to the rejection of the hypothesis
that ra4 ndom chance accounts for all the outcomes
INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF THE REMAINING
HYPOTHESES INVOLVING SITUATIONAL CHOICES
In the typical case, the elimination of the random
chance hypothesis has the affirmative effect of in-
creasing the probability of the remaining explana-
tory hypotheses, including those hypothesizing
situational choice rather than choice prompted by
the person's character trait.
2. Working Backward from the Ultimate Conclusion under the
Doctrine
In discrimination cases such as Castaneda,22 ° the defense asks
the jury to accept the hypothesis that innocent random chance ac-
counts for all the outcomes-there was no discrimination. 221 As-
sume, though, that the disparity between the expected and actual
values is so significant that it leads to the rejection of that hy-
220. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
221. See id. at 498-99.
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pothesis. What is the significance of that rejection? Even if we re-
ject that hypothesis, it is a logical fallacy to leap to the conclusion
that all the outcomes represent intentional misdeeds (intentional
misconduct). As framed, the hypothesis must be rejected when-
ever even one of the outcomes is an accident.
Properly construed, the doctrine of chances recognizes the lim-
ited probative value of the disproof of the random chance hy-
pothesis. Revisit Woods.222 Cumulatively, there were twenty-one
cyanotic episodes, including Paul's death.223 However, nothing in-
herent in the logic of the doctrine singled out the charged inci-
dent, Paul's death, as a homicide.224 The only direct inference
from the doctrine of chances is that one or some of the incidents
were not accidents. The doctrine does not prove that the charged
incident was a crime, much less that all the incidents were
crimes. On the one hand, the doctrine of chances evidence is
logically relevant and presumptively admissible; to a degree, the
negative disproof of the random chance hypothesis affirmatively
increases the probability of the competing explanations for the
outcomes, including the explanations which do not entail propen-
sity inferences. On the other hand, the doctrine of chances stand-
ing alone might be legally insufficient to sustain the prosecution's
or plaintiffs burden of production.226 Again, in Woods, it was criti-
cal that the prosecution also had the benefit of Dr. DiMaio's tes-
timony pointing to the suspicious circumstances surrounding
Paul's death.
It is significant that the only conclusion flowing directly from
doctrine of chances reasoning is that one or some of the incidents
222. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
223. See id. at 130.
224. 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 9:88; Kyser, supra note
15, at 542.
225. See 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 9:88, at 257-58.
226. See id. In an extreme fact situation, though, even without the benefit of other evi-
dence, the doctrine of chances evidence could arguably suffice. By way of example, suppose
that the normal person suffers a particular type of loss only once during his or her life-
time, but the defendant has suffered the loss one thousand times. However, even this fact
situation would raise the question of whether a "purely" statistical case is ever legally suf-
ficient. Compare Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1380 (1985) (stating that in such a case,
"the evidence would never reach the jury"), with Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of
Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 429 n.67 (1986) ("Support for the proposition that courts
are reluctant to allow these cases to be decided on the basis of 'statistical evidence' is
greatly exaggerated in the literature.").
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were not accidents. Again, the critics of the doctrine assert that
the doctrine implicitly requires an assumption that the defendant
has a "consistent[ ,' 227 "constant,''221 "continuing,"229 or "unchang-
ing"23° character trait "across time."23' If this were true, as Mr.
Morris quite correctly points out, then the jury would be required
to infer that "all"232 the outcomes are non-accidental and that
"every"233 act was intentional. Without more, however, doctrine of
chances evidence neither requires nor even permits the jurors to
reach that final conclusion. If the doctrine does not yield that fi-
nal conclusion, it cannot posit an antecedent intermediate infer-
ence of "constant"234 character.
B. The Practical Safeguards Reinforcing the Distinction at Trial
It is a question of logic whether the doctrine of chances theory
embodies an implicit, forbidden character inference. The preced-
ing analysis has hopefully demonstrated that the doctrine does
not suffer from that flaw. However, it is an empirical question
whether lay jurors are competent to comply with a limiting in-
struction, permitting them to engage in doctrine of chances rea-
soning but forbidding them from relying on character reasoning.
There is good reason for concern. The distinction between char-
acter and non-character theories can be a "thin" one.235 In one
case, Estelle v. McGuire,236 the Supreme Court of the United
States came close to granting habeas corpus relief because the
judge's instruction on the doctrine of chances was so confusingly
worded that there was a danger that lay jurors might have misin-
terpreted it as authorizing them to engage in character reason-
ing.237 Further, there is a considerable body of psychological re-
227. Morris, supra note 34, at 195.
228. Id. at 194.
229. Id. at 195, 201.
230. Id. at 191, 201.
231. Id. at 194.
232. Id. at 203.
233. Id. at 201.
234. Id. at 194.
235. United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1313 (8th Cir. 1986); Morris, supra note 34,
at 200 n.74.
236. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
237. See id. at 71-75.
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search calling into question lay jurors' ability to comply with lim-
iting instructions.
However, the findings in the psychological studies are by no
means uniform. For example, a Canadian study discovered that
the jurors took the instruction quite seriously and resisted the
temptation to misuse uncharged misconduct evidence. 9 In that
light, it may be premature to dismiss limiting instructions as
worthless.
At trial, there are numerous precautions that the trial judge
and the opponent can take to reduce the risk that the jury will
overstep its boundaries and treat the doctrine of chances evidence
as proof of the defendant's bad character. To begin with, both the
judge and the opponent should insist that the proponent lay a
proper foundation. In some cases, that will necessitate an af-
firmative showing of the ordinary incidence of the type of loss
that befell the defendant or the type of event that the defendant
became involved in.24° When the record contains that evidence,
the jury is more likely to deliberate about the critical disparity
between the actual and expected values and less likely to focus
mistakenly on the defendant's personal, subjective character.
Next, the judge should be willing to give, and the opponent
should emphasize, the limiting instruction. The instruction ought
to highlight the difference between legitimate doctrine of chances
reasoning and forbidden character reasoning.24' In particular, the
instruction should condemn the latter in no uncertain terms.242
Given the difficulty that the jury may have understanding the
distinction, the judge can repeat the instruction, giving it once
when the evidence is admitted and again in the final jury
charge.243 For his or her part, in closing argument the opponent
238. See 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 27, § 1:03.
239. Evelyn Goldstein Schaefer & Kristine L. Hansen, Similar Fact Evidence and Lim-
ited Use Instructions: An Empirical Investigation, 14 CRIM. L.J. 157, 173-75 (1990); see
also Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury In-
structions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 419 (1990).
240. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Mis-
conduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evi-
dence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 597-98 (1990).
241. See, e.g., 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 9:72 (Cum. Supp.
2004).
242. See, e.g., id. §§ 9:71-:72.
243. See id. at § 9:74.
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should dwell on the instruction to ensure that the jury both un-
derstands the distinction and appreciates its obligation to follow
the instruction.2 "
Lastly, the trial judge and opponent must be prepared to police
the proponent's closing argument. Even if the proponent initially
offers the evidence for a limited non-character purpose, in closing,
the proponent may slip and invite the jury to misuse the testi-
mony as character evidence.245 When the proponent does so, the
opponent should immediately move to strike and, in an extreme
case, consider moving for a mistrial. Cumulatively, these proce-
dural safeguards afford the defendant a measure of protection
against misuse of the evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
When the defense submitted its brief in the Woods case thirty-
two years ago, the defense counsel could accurately represent to
the Court of Appeals that, as of that date, there were no pub-
lished American decisions explicitly endorsing the doctrine of ob-
jective chances.246 There were only a few, isolated opinions con-
taining "loose language" that appeared to approve "the divergent
English rule."247
In the relatively short span of three decades, the state of the
American case law has changed dramatically. The doctrine of
chances is now a fixture in the American jurisprudence on un-
charged misconduct evidence. The doctrine looms large: If a
plaintiff wants to prove discriminatory animus in a civil rights
action or the government desires to establish actus reus in a child
abuse prosecution or knowledge in a drug case, they frequently
invoke the doctrine to justify the introduction of the uncharged
misconduct evidence needed to supply the proof. when they do so,
in the courtroom they will insist that the doctrine qualifies as a
non-character theory. If the trial judge accepts that characteriza-
244. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Limiting Instructions on Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence: The Last Line of Defense Against Jury Misuse of the Evidence, TRIAL DIPL. J.,
Fall 1985, at 23, 26 (suggesting that the prosecution benefits from limiting instructions).
245. See 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 9:78.
246. Reply Brief of Appellant at 11-12, United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.
1973) (No. 72-2217).
247. Id. at 12.
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tion of the doctrine, then the character evidence prohibition will
not stand in the way of the proponent's introduction of the neces-
sary evidence.
The paradox today is that upholding the doctrine as a non-
character theory may be the best line of defense for the character
evidence prohibition itself. As previously stated, it is often im-
perative for prosecutors to introduce testimony about the defen-
dant's uncharged misconduct in child abuse and drug prosecu-
tions, and for plaintiffs to do likewise in civil rights cases. These
types of cases not only implicate pressing public interests; in ad-
dition, they often attract media and public attention.248 If the ju-
diciary embraced the arguments of the critics of the doctrine of
chances and routinely excluded that type of testimony as inad-
missible character evidence, then the exclusion would have a
negative impact on the enforcement of the laws against child
abuse, drug trafficking, and discrimination. The public might well
become aware of that impact. The public awareness could easily
trigger a political and legislative backlash,249 which might claim
the character evidence prohibition as a victim. Ms. Marshall's
note augurs that possibility. In her view, the rigorous enforce-
ment of the character evidence prohibition will deprive civil
rights plaintiffs of evidence they desperately need to prove dis-
criminatory intent.25 ° She fears that an uncompromising applica-
tion of the prohibition will "drastically undermine" civil rights
law "in contravention of congressional intent."251 Given a stark
choice between upholding the prohibition and enforcing the social
248. For example, witness the intense media attention given to the 2004-2005 prosecu-
tion of Michael Jackson, including the media discussion of the extensive uncharged mis-
conduct evidence proffered against the defendant. See, e.g., Prosecutors Seek Prior Claims
in Jackson Trial, CNN.coM, Dec. 15, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/IAW/12/15/ackson.
case/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
249. The political backlash against the acquittal of John Hinkley, Jr., who attempted to
assassinate President Reagan in 1981 contributed the Congressional decision to amend
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) to restrict testimony about the defendant's insanity. See
Anne Lawson Braswell, Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of
Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 623-24 (1987). Simi-
larly, there is a sense that the acquittal of William Kennedy Smith, Jr., on sexual assault
charges in Florida has been in the back of mind of some of the state legislatures which
have selectively abolished the character evidence prohibition in prosecutions for such
charges. See generally Mark Hansen, Experts Expected Smith Verdict, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992,
at 18. One of the key evidentiary rulings in the Smith case was the trial judge's decision to
preclude the prosecution from introducing testimony about other sexual offenses that the
defendant had allegedly committed. Id.
250. Marshall, supra note 20, at 1068-71, 1097-98.
251. Id. at 1098.
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policies inspiring civil rights laws, she would opt for the latter.252
If the courts reject the doctrine of chances as a non-character the-
ory and exclude uncharged misconduct evidence as a matter of
course in civil rights, child abuse, and drug cases, then Congress
and many state legislatures may very well make the same choice.
The case against the doctrine of chances rests on the argument
that the doctrine relies on implicit, forbidden propensity infer-
ences. The critics of the doctrine contend that the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence proffered under the doctrine is logically relevant
only if one assumes that the person has a constant character trait
across time. Part IV demonstrated that that contention is un-
sound. There are explanatory hypotheses for the outcomes other
than the two obvious possibilities that chance accounts for all the
outcomes and that all the outcomes are intentional acts,
prompted by the person's character traits. Those other possibili-
ties consist of hypotheses in which the person's situational
choices account for one, some, or all of the outcomes. By nega-
tively discrediting the random chance hypothesis, the doctrine af-
firmatively increases the probability assigned to those hypothe-
ses. Moreover, since the only final conclusion necessarily yielded
by the doctrine is that one or some of the incidents are not acci-
dents, logically an assumption of the person's unchanging charac-
ter cannot be embedded in the doctrine. If that were such an as-
sumption, the final conclusion under the doctrine would have to
be that all the events are intentional acts. Rather, the logic of the
doctrine yields a more limited final conclusion. Indeed, the nature
of the conclusion is so limited that in some cases, without addi-
tional evidence the proponent will win the battle but lose the war.
The proponent may succeed in introducing the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence; but without additional proof such as Dr. Di-
Maio's testimony in Woods, the judge will be forced to rule that
the proponent has not sustained his or her initial burden of pro-
duction to reach the jury. The evidence will be admissible but le-
gally insufficient to make out a submissible case.
There is more at stake here than the courts' continued willing-
ness to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence under the doc-
trine of chances. This controversy implicates the very future of
the character evidence prohibition. In truth, the critics of the
general prohibition and the doctrine of chances have rendered a
252. Id.
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huge service to the jurisprudence of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence in the United States. When Professors Kuhns and Uviller
released their articles in the early 1980s, there was undeniable
merit in their claim that the courts' treatment of purportedly non-
character theories was usually conclusory and that the courts of-
ten accepted illicit bad character evidence in disguise. Sadly, in
the past some courts have indiscriminately 53 treated non-
character theories such as plan as "talisman[s], the mere utter-
ance of which" surmounts a character evidence objection.25 4 Pro-
fessor Rothstein was the first commentator to perceptively raise
this question specifically in connection with the doctrine of
chances, and Ms. Marshall has persuasively demonstrated that
the question is lively in civil actions as well as prosecutions. For
his part, Mr. Morris has made the most detailed attempt to iden-
tify the propensity inferences supposedly implicit in the doctrine
of chances theory.
Part IV of this article argued that the attacks on the doctrine's
status as a non-character theory are mistaken. The uncharged
misconduct accepted under the doctrine is logically relevant with-
out positing any assumption about the defendant's personal, sub-
jective bad character. Nevertheless, the critics' attacks on the
doctrine have been quite helpful. Thanks to their efforts-
through an analysis of their attacks-we can arrive at a better,
more refined understanding of the utility and limitations of the
doctrine. That understanding should enable the courts to avoid
any affront to common sense by admitting vital, probative evi-
dence while respecting the significant policies promoted by the
character evidence prohibition.
253. State v. Yager, 461 N.W.2d 741, 751-52 (Neb. 1990) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
254. United States v. Sneezer, 983 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 1992) (O'Scannlain, J., dis-
senting in part).
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